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This paper studies differences in migration attitudes between 2002 and 2016 in two of the most 
important European migration countries, Germany and the United Kingdom. These years are 
interesting from a migration perspective as 2002 was just before a large EU expansion, while 
2016 was just after the migration crisis of 2015, and the year of the Brexit referendum. The 
research question in this paper is: how have the attitudes toward migration changed between 
2002 and 2016 in the United Kingdom and Germany? Using different regression models, 
differences can be found between the years. The findings show, opposing common perceptions, 
that the attitudes are more positive in 2016 than in 2002. Also, that Germans are slightly more 
positive than British individuals toward migration. Other findings show that education and 
income have a positive impact on attitudes, and that age and political placement have a negative 
impact on attitudes toward migration. The findings correspond well with previous literature and 
the results are as expected. None of the independent variables used in this study are sufficient 
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Migration is seen as one of the most important issues within Europe, especially since the 
migration crisis of 2015. Questions like how to distribute migrants from abroad and how 
migrants might affect the national identities of European countries have gained ground in the 
last few years (Davidov et al., 2020). At the Brexit referendum, immigration was seen as the 
main issue for the individuals voting “leave”, partly because of the migration crisis of 2015 
(Zappettini, 2019). At the same time, the question of migration is not a new one, individuals 
have migrated as long as they exist and there is a long history of migration. In the early 2000s, 
the EU 2004 expansion created new questions regarding migration, for example, would the 106 
million new EU citizens flood the other member states with migrants due to the high 
unemployment in the east. Germany was already struggling with citizenship and immigration, 
so they were especially afraid of a potential flooding of labor immigration (Taras, 2003). When 
migration becomes an important topic, individuals take on different attitudes toward migration 
depending on the migration situation e.g. how many migrants are entering the country and how 
they are affecting the host country. This paper examines attitudes on migration in times of EU 
changes and when migration was seen as a main issue or was expected to become a main issue1. 
 
1.1. Purpose and Research Gap 
When migration becomes a more debated issue, the research on the topic gets more attention as 
well. Recently, many papers have been published explaining the determinants of migration 
attitudes, and most findings show that individual characteristics such as education, age, and 
income shape attitudes toward migration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 
2019, Davidov et al., 2020, Mclaren & Paterson, 2020). Contextual characteristics also shape 
migration attitudes, for example Heath et al. (2019) argue that attitudes toward migration often 
differ between countries. Different countries have different histories regarding migration; some 
have a colonial history with migrants from former colonies, and some have history with large 
migration from neighboring countries. Many of the papers on migration attitudes used data from 
the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS). The purpose of this paper is to find changes in 
migration attitudes before the EU 2004 expansion and during the migration crisis of 2015. In 
 
1 Attitudes on how many migrants to allow to the country. 
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order to do so, the 2002 and 2016 European Social Surveys will be used. Moreover, much of 
the previous literature makes analysis on the whole ESS data which makes it hard to make clear 
arguments regarding to national differences. Therefore, this paper goes into more detail on the 
national level by comparing two important migration countries with each other.  
 
This paper contributes to the field of migration attitude studies by finding how migration 
attitudes changed between 2002 and 2016, and what shapes these over time changes. In these 
two years, migration was a central topic and attitudes play an important role in the future of 
migration. To account for national differences, not all countries will be analyzed, instead two 
central countries in the migration topic are chosen. The countries that will be analyzed are the 
United Kingdom and Germany. The reason why these two countries were chosen is that they 
both had migration as a central issue in the years 2002 and 2016. In 2002, just before the EU 
2004 expansion, Germany and the United Kingdom were expected to receive great amounts of 
migrants from the new member states. This made the discussion about migration highly relevant 
and both countries implemented different policies and transition periods to restrict the flows of 
migration. Germany was expected to receive large flows of migrants due to its closeness to 
eastern European countries, while the United Kingdom was expected to receive a substantial 
share of migrants as many individuals were already speaking English, making it less of a risk 
to migrate (Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003, Wadensjö, 2007).  
 
Similarly, in 2016, again migration was heavily debated, both in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. On the one side Germany received the highest share of asylum seekers of all 
European countries during the 2015 migration crisis (Connor, 2016). On the other side, 
Zapettini (2019) argues that the United Kingdom left the EU because of the migration issue. By 
analyzing attitudes toward migration in 2002 and 2016 in Germany and the United Kingdom, 
this paper will contribute to the studies of migration attitudes and European studies by creating 
a better understanding for different determinants of migration attitudes and find how they 
changed between 2002 and 2016. What determinants were more important and how did these 
determinants affect an eventual change over time. How the general opinion toward migration 
changed between 2002 and 2016 will also be analyzed. These two years are surrounded by three 
major European events; the EU expansion of 2004, the migration crisis of 2015 and the Brexit 
referendum of 2016. Germany and the United Kingdom are in the European context somewhere 
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around the average when looking at migration attitudes. They are not particularly negative nor 
positive, the differences between Germany and the United Kingdom are not large (Heath & 




The research question that will be answered in this paper is the following: 
 
How have the attitudes toward migration changed between 2002 and 2016 in the United 
Kingdom and Germany? 
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2. Theory and Previous Research 
An interesting part of migration is that it has been criticized by different actors through the 
years. The biggest critique on migration is often toward immigration sizes, how many migrants 
should be allowed. This has lately evolved into an important issue dividing individuals all over 
Europe. The European Social Survey (ESS) performs surveys through interviews every two 
years on different social aspects including attitudes toward migration, which will be used in the 
current paper. The theory and previous research of this paper are as follows. First, different 
determinants on migration attitudes will be presented, followed by a short historical background 
to migration in the specific countries. Lastly, the expectations of the study will be presented.  
 
2.1. Determinants of Migration Attitudes 
2.1.1. Socioeconomic Determinants 
Many studies have focused on the relationship between different socioeconomic factors and 
perceptions toward immigration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, 
Davidov et al., 2020, Mewes & Mau, 2013 and Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). Most of these 
studies have indicated a link between factors such as, education, employment status, age and 
perceptions of immigration. Education is one of the most important determinants of attitudes 
toward migration. It was found that the higher the education is, the more positive the individuals 
are toward migration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 
2020). 
 
Employment status is also found to be a common determinant in previous research. Findings 
show that employed individuals often are more likely to have positive attitudes toward 
migration than unemployed individuals. Competition over the same jobs can explain why this 
is the case (Esipova et al. 2015, Davidov et al. 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). Another 
determinant of attitudes toward migration which is closely related to employment status is 
income. Different papers have discussed income as a determinant and most conclude that higher 
income leads to more positive attitudes toward migration (Davidov et al., 2020, Esipova et al., 
2015). Often low-income individuals compete for the same jobs as immigrants because many 
immigrants often take on less prestigious jobs with lower wages. Using the same line of 
argument, it was found that individuals from wealthier European countries tend to be more 
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supportive toward migrants from poorer European countries because they would not compete 
on the same jobs as the wealthier individuals, and instead take less prestigious jobs that natives 
are not willing to perform. At the same time, individuals from less wealthy European countries 
are more likely to support immigration from richer European countries than poorer because 
they won’t be a burden on the social welfare system (Davidov et al., 2020, Gorodzeisky & 
Semyonov, 2019, Gorodzeisky, 2011). In other words, socioeconomic vulnerable individuals 
are more likely to oppose migration. A similar finding is that when the national or personal 
economic situation is better, individuals are more likely to be supportive toward migration, and 
vice versa (Esipova et al. 2015, Davidov et al. 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). 
 
Another factor that was found in some papers is age. The general finding is that age has a 
negative effect on migration attitudes, the older you are, the more negative you are toward 
migration (Esipova et al. 2015, Mclaren & Paterson, 2020). McLaren & Paterson (2020) also 
discuss that age as determinant can be seen from different perspectives. They argue that there 
hasn’t been enough research on the topic of generational changes and how they affect attitudes 
toward migration. Age is counted as a main variable in many migration attitudes studies, but 
whether there is a generational effect is not clear. They argue that it is important to distinguish 
between age, period and cohort effects. Age effects refer to differences between different age 
groups within society, for instance old individuals or young individuals as a group. Period 
effects refer to differences in time or special events, for instance a group of individuals who 
lived through a time of war or economic depressions. Cohort refers to differences in groups of 
individuals experiencing a similar initial event, mostly proximity in birth years. When 
measuring the variable age, most studies conclude that older individuals are less tolerant toward 
migration than younger individuals. Thus, McLaren & Paterson (2020) ask the question if this 
means that when we get older, we also get less tolerant toward migration, or that it is a 
generational issue instead. The findings show that there is a change in attitudes when getting 
older, and that generational differences can affect the attitudes. Also, political actors try to 
influence the process. Because political values are often shaped early in life, politicians are 
trying to target younger adults and change attitudes. Especially parties from the far right use 
this method to promote anti-immigration attitudes. It is though hard to distinguish between age 
and generational differences, a broader focus on generational change can be achieved by 
categorizing the different ages into generations. This paper will though not focus on the 
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generational change, but rather on the differences in age, thus no such categorizing will be done. 
Cohort effects will not be measured either.  
 
Finally, theory states that when individuals are more socially distant from migrants, the 
perceptions to migration size are larger (Esses, 2020, Heath et al. 2020). Contact with migrants 
reduces the negative attitudes and perception on migration size, if the contact is of positive 
character. However, having social contact with immigrants is said not to be sufficient as an 
aspect in creating positive attitudes toward migrants, rather the quality of the experience plays 
a significant role. Having friends or acquaintances that are immigrants does have a more 
positive effect, this could depend on the same theory that good experiences are more important 
than just the contact, as being friends is often a sign of good experiences with a person (Ibid).  
 
The socioeconomic factors being analyzed in this paper are age, education and income. Contact 
with migrants will not be used as a variable, but it should be taken into consideration that this 
could affect the migration attitudes. For example, in Germany, individuals are more open to 
close contact with migrants, some were willing to take migrants into their own homes (Scholle, 
2019). Thus, the attitudes are expected to be more positive in Germany than in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
2.1.2. Psychological Determinants 
The main psychological determinant being presented is perceived threat and competition. 
Perceived threat and competition can be in different aspects. For example, on economic, 
cultural, security or demographic levels. The “group threat” theoretical model explains 
prejustice and discrimination toward ethnic and racial minorities. The group threat model builds 
on fear of competition resulting from an increase in a group coming from elsewhere, such as 
migrants. According to this theory, anti-immigrant sentiment is higher in places with higher 
competition, for example through large migrant populations. Other findings show that when 
perception of threat from immigrants is high, the acceptance of migrants shows lower values, 
and vice versa. Professional and skilled migrants are often perceived more positively than lower 
skilled migrants, and individuals are more supportive of migration from European countries 
than non-European countries (Esses, 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018, Davidov et al., 
2020, Heath et al., 2020). Misperceptions about migration size can also influence attitudes, most 
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individuals overestimate their country’s migrant populations size, but these misperceptions are 
smaller in countries with large migrant populations (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019). 
 
Personality traits can affect attitudes toward other social groups including migrants. For 
instance, individuals open to experiences are often more positive to migration while neuroticism 
is a predictor of more negative attitudes (Esses, 2020). A similar determinant: Emotions and 
stereotypes is a determinant about stereotypes and empathy. Emotions such as anxiety, anger, 
fear or contempt can change attitudes toward migrants (Esses, 2020). It should be noted that 
while these are important determinants of attitudes on migration, they will not be included in 
this study due to them not being included in a useful way in the ESS data.   
 
Individuals’ ideology is an important determinant of attitudes on migration as it was found that 
conservative and nationalist individuals have a higher tendency to oppose migration. 
Individuals with a left-wing ideology tend to a greater degree agree that migrants contribute to 
their country than ideologically right-wing individuals. When migration policies focus more on 
integration, the individuals are usually also more supportive toward more migration. Similarly, 
individuals with more traditional and conservative values are more likely to have lower 
acceptance toward migrants and universalist individuals are more likely to have higher 
acceptance. In addition, perceived threat toward migration is also higher among traditional and 
conservative individuals than among universalist individuals (Esses, 2020, Gonzalez-Barrera 
& Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020). 
 
From the psychological determinants, only political views (left/right) will be used in the 
analysis. National attachment can be related to the political left/right scale because right-wing 
individuals often have a greater national attachment than left-wing individual (Esses, 2020). 
Unfortunately, emotions, stereotypes and personalities will not be included in this study as there 
is no ESS data is available for these determinants.  
 
2.1.3. National Determinants 
There are national differences in opposition toward migration and the migratory history of a 
country plays a role in shaping these opinions. For instance, countries with a colonial history 
tend to receive more migrants from former colonies, while other countries might have received 
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more migrants from other parts of the world. Countries with several generations of labor 
migration have to deal with other issues compared to countries with a shorter migration history 
(Heath et al. 2020, Gorodzeisky, 2011, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). For example, 
significant cross-country differences in attitudes were found after the migration crisis in six 
European countries (Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). Greece, Germany and Italy had less 
individuals thinking that migrants strengthened their country, while Spain, the United Kingdom 
and France had a higher number of individuals thinking that migration strengthened their 
country.  
 
Around the world, individuals are more supportive toward migration than what general 
perceptions might suggest (Esipova et al., 2015). Although Europeans are the most negative 
individuals opposing migration, the attitudes have become more positive in Europe as well. 
Nonetheless, cross-country differences exist; Northern European countries with an exception 
for the United Kingdom are generally more positive toward migration than the southern 
European countries (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 
2020).  
 
Media coverage can also affect attitudes toward migration, as the ideological climate shows 
how migration issues are being reported in the receiving country. This ideological climate is 
mainly shaped by news sources, but political organizations try to influence the ideological 
climate as well. When the media coverage is mainly negative on migration, and the country 
already has a large migration stock, individuals tend to be more negative toward migration 
(Esses, 2020, Heath et al. 2020, Boomgaarden & Vliegenhart, 2009). This is important to 
consider when analyzing the political left/right scale. In Germany and the United Kingdom, the 
ideological climate differs, which can have an impact on the results. Political agendas might 
differ between the countries, as the German right-wing might be less critical toward migration 
than the British right-wing. How critical major news sources are on migration in the two 





2.2. Historical Background 
2.2.1. Migration in Europe after WWII 
The literature holds that post-World War II immigration to Europe can be divided into four 
major periods: the decolonization period (1945-1973), the economic stagnation and 
restructuring (1973-1989), the end of the cold war (1989- 2008), and the post-great recession 
slump (since 2008). The first period was the first time Europe became a migration destination, 
many individuals were displaced after WWII and during the decolonization, many individuals 
moved from former colonies to the old colonizers, especially in the United Kingdom, France, 
the Netherlands and Belgium. The second period was known for the more anti-immigration 
period. High unemployment led to the idea that guest workers would migrate home. Instead, 
the opposite happened, many families got reunited and new migrant communities started 
growing. The third period was known as the time when many migrants from eastern Europe 
moved to western Europe. After 2008, the recession created a large unemployment among 
migrant workers. Less migrants came during these times, although similar to the second period, 
no huge flows of migrants moving home occurred and new communities got created. After the 
recession, the 2015 migration crisis partly due to the war in Syria brought many new migrants 
to Europe (de Haas, 2020). 
 
2.2.2. Background: Germany 
Germany has had a long history of migration since the late 19th century. During 
industrialization in the late 1800s to early 1900s, many poles moved to the Ruhr Valley in 
western Germany, and after WWII, many migrants from southern Europe, northern Africa, the 
Balkans and Turkey entered Germany. These migrants were not always as welcome, it was 
normal for especially the polish migrants during the industrialization to be treated hostilely by 
the local population, reasons for this might have been religion or the fact that the migrants were 
poor and refugees. Most migrants moved to the west, whereas the east of Germany never 
experienced high amounts of migration during these periods. After the German reunification in 
1990, integration and multiculturalism gained support. During the migrant crisis of 2015 and 
the war in Syria, many individuals were open to help the refugees coming to Germany. At the 
same time, anti-immigration movements like Pegida grew and gained more attention. It should 
be noted that after the 2015–16 New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Germany, many started to 
question the integration and multiculturalism idea. Questions like “how would the integration 
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deal with “criminal” migrants and was the integration of the older migrants and their children 
a success or not?” were brought up. In addition, the question of Islam fitting with German 
integration gained ground. The anti-immigration party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) also 
gained support after the migration crisis and entered the Bundestag for the first time in 2017 
getting 12.6 percent of the votes. (Scholle 2019).  
 
That being said, data from Eurobarometer (2018) shows that a majority of the Germans believe 
that migrants enrich cultural life in Germany and have a positive impact on the economy. But 
also, that they are a burden on the welfare system and worsen the crime problem. When asked 
if migrants take jobs away from Germans, a majority disagreed. Overall, Germans have become 
slightly less pessimistic toward migration in 2018 compared to the migration crisis of 2015. 
Other findings show that when the media covers migration, it has a slight positive effect on 
migration attitudes in Germany. It was argued that more media coverage on migration makes 
individuals get a familiar feeling toward migrants (Scholle 2019, Boomgaarden & Vliegenhart, 
2009). 
 
2.2.3. Background: The United Kingdom 
The migration question has become a key public concern in the United Kingdom since the early 
2000s. While in 1983, two thirds of the UK population believed that the number of migrants 
should be reduced, by 2003, this share had risen to around three quarters and stayed stable until 
2009 (Saran, 2009). British individuals were more hostile and concerned toward migrants 
compared to other European countries. That being said, migration is not a new problem in the 
United Kingdom, but recent inflows and greater media coverage has made it a bigger public 
concern. In the United Kingdom, individuals read national newspapers more than in other 
European countries. Saran argues that this might be one of the reasons British individuals are 
more concerned about migration on the national level. A low share considers immigration to be 
a problem in their local neighborhoods, which can be a result of less media coverage on the 
local level. Though, only media coverage would be too simplistic to explain differences 
between countries in negative attitudes, but can play a part (Saran, 2009, Crawley et al. 2013). 
 
In the survey Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, attitudes are being compared between the 
United states and six European countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany. 
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Migration is seen as a bigger issue in the United Kingdom than in the other countries. The 
United Kingdom had the highest number of respondents saying that immigration is a decisive 
question when choosing which party to vote for. The British were a bit more skeptical about 
giving migrants access to the social welfare system than the other European countries (Saran, 
2009). Crawley et al. (2013) argue that the British attitudes toward migration are on a downward 
trend and will not stop soon. At the same time, there are differences within the United Kingdom, 
individuals from London are relatively more supportive toward migration than the rest of the 
country, although this might depend on the ever-rising share of London inhabitants being higher 
educated.  
 
2.3. Summary of Findings and Expectations 
Most papers seem to agree that education has an important role in the shaping of attitudes 
toward migration, the higher the education, the more positive opinion toward migration. 
Another frequently found determinant is age, older individuals tend to be more negatively 
toward migration than younger individuals. The employment status is found to often affect the 
attitudes, unemployed individuals are generally more negatively toward migration than 
employed individuals. In addition, perception about the magnitude of migrant share is said to 
have an effect on attitudes toward migrants, for example when perception is higher than actual 
numbers of migrants, attitudes tend to be more negative. Media coverage is argued to affect the 
attitudes, national differences play a bigger role here because all countries have different media 
channels. Different countries also have different migratory situations and history. This paper 
will look further into these national differences by looking at two of the most central European 
countries in the migration issue, analyze their migration attitudes and compare values on 
specific determinants including education, age, income, and placement on the political left/right 
scale. Because these determinants are among those most common in previous research, these 
will also be tested on how much they affect an eventual change in attitudes over time.  
 
2.3.1. Expectations and Hypotheses 
Many of the studies concluded that migration attitudes in general have become more positive 
during the last decades (Heath & Richards, 2016, Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & 
Connor, 2019). Thus, it is expected that this paper will come to the same conclusion. Even 
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though the situation with Brexit, this is expected in both countries. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is made:  
H1: Attitudes toward migration are more positive in 2016 than in 2002. 
 
Education is according to many papers seen as one of the most important determinants of 
migration attitudes. The higher the education, the more positive toward migration (Esipova et 
al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020). The second is hypothesis 
is therefore:  
H2: Education has a positive impact on migration attitudes, where higher educated are more 
positive than lower educated.  
 
Older individuals tend to have more negative attitudes toward migration than younger 
individuals (Esipova et al. 2015, Mclaren & Paterson, 2020). The third hypothesis is thus: 
H3: Age has a negative impact on migration attitudes, where older individuals are more 
negative than younger individuals. 
 
Income is said to affect migration attitudes in a positive matter (Davidov et al., 2020, Esipova 
et al., 2015). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is:  
H4: Income has a positive impact on migration attitudes, where richer individuals are more 
positive than poorer individuals. 
 
Right-wing individuals are more negative toward migration than left-wing individuals (Esses, 
2020, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020). The fifth hypothesis is thus:  
H5: Being political right wing has a negative impact on migration attitudes. 
 
It is expected that Germans will be slightly more positive toward migration than British 
individuals. In 2002, the United Kingdom might have slightly more negative attitudes because 
British individuals have become more worried about migration since the 1980s (Saran, 2009, 
Crawley et al., 2013). Whereas Germans were more open to multiculturalism and migration 
after the reunification of 1990 (Scholle, 2019). Germany is also expected to be slightly more 
positive toward migration than the United Kingdom in 2016. This is because Germans in 
general were welcoming the refugees during the migration crisis of 2015 (Scholle, 2019), where 
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others state that the United Kingdom left the EU because they wanted less migrants (Zappettini, 
2019). Thus, the sixth hypothesis is:  
H6: Germans are more positive toward migration than British individuals. 
 
As the world is becoming more polarized (Heath & Richards, 2016), more individuals are 
higher educated and income gaps grow, it is expected that the effect of higher education and 
income is larger in 2016 than in 2002. Thus, the seventh and eight hypotheses are:  
H7: The effect of higher education is larger in 2016 than in 2002. 
H8: The effect of net income is larger in 2016 than in 2002. 
 
None of the papers to my knowledge argue that the effect of age has changed over the years, 
thus it is expected that this study will not find a difference in age over the years.  
H9: The effect of age doesn’t change between 2002 and 2016. 
 
As many anti-immigration parties gained ground especially on the right wing (Scholle, 2019, 
Esses, 2020), it is expected that the effect of the political left/right placement is stronger in 
2016.  






To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, a fitting method will be used. The 
method will be of quantitative character and consist of three main parts. First, basic descriptive 
statistics will be presented, this will be useful to see differences in shares between 2002 and 
2016. Differences in shares can show us how groups have changed over time, for example, how 
the age distribution is, or how the share of higher educated has changed.  
The second part will consist of different multivariate regression analyses for each country and 
year separately. In total four different regression models will be presented, one for Germany in 
2002, Germany 2016, the United Kingdom 2002 and the United Kingdom 2016. The dependent 
variable will be Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority. The 
independent variables will be Highest level of education, Age of respondent, Household’s total 
net income and Placement on left/right scale. These models will enable us to see to what extent 
the set of independent variables explains attitudes toward immigration in the two countries at 
different periods.  
The third section will be based on a multivariate regression of a pooled sample for the two years 
for each country. By pooling the two years’ samples together for each country, I will be able to 
shade light on over time changes in attitudes toward immigration and the factors that might 
explain these over time changes. The model for Germany will consist of all German data from 
ESS round 1 (2002) and ESS round 8 (2016). Similarly, the model for the United Kingdom will 
consist of all British data from ESS round 1 and ESS round 82. 
By merging the datasets as described above, differences between the years will be measured 
using a year dummy, which represents the main effect; differences in the mean attitudes toward 
migration between 2002 and 2016. In addition, interaction terms will be added to the models to 
 
2 Appendix 1 and 2 show similar models on the years 2002 and 2016 separately by pooling the two countries 
datasets similar as in the above model. These different multivariate regression analyses have the aim to measure 
between country differences. The 2002 model will consist of all data from 2002 in Germany and the UK. The 
2016 model will consist of all data from 2016 in Germany and the UK. A country variable will be computed in 
the models 2002 and 2016 to measure differences between the countries, where the country represents Germany. 
The variables Country X Education, Country X Age, Country X Net income and Country X Left/right will be 
computed to measure differences in variables between the countries. 
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enable the effect of each independent variable to vary over time. These interaction variables are 
(1) Year X Education, (2) Year X Age, (3) Year X Net income and (4) Year X Left /right. 
These variables are chosen because previous research has shown them to be associated with 
attitudes toward immigration. This paper does not have the intention to find whole new 
determinants, rather it has the purpose to find differences and similarities over time in the 
patterns on attitudes toward migration in the two countries.  
 
The choice of regression analysis is because it fits the characteristics of the data. The aim is to 
show correlations between attitudes toward migration and the determinants, and to assess which 
determinants are stronger, and which are weaker. Then compare these over two different years 
and countries and see how they changed. The descriptive part is useful because it can show 
differences in shares over times. Many of the previous studies used either one of these methods, 
which indicates that it is a common and proven method in migration attitudes studies.  
 
3.2. Material 
The data used in this study is from the European Social Survey 1 (2002) and the European 
Social Survey 8 (2016). The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academic driven cross-
national survey providing data on attitudes to different kinds of questions3. The 2002 and 2014 
surveys are more focused on migration topics. 2016 was not focused on migration, but a few 
migration related questions were asked. This shows to be enough to provide a comparison on 
migration attitudes between 2002 and 2016. Migration is usually one of the topics being tested. 
In the ESS 1, migration was more of a central topic than in ESS 8, but the data is still sufficient 
to work with. The ESS releases new surveys every two years with the most recent being the 
ESS 9 in 2018. 2002 and 2016 are chosen because of the proximity to major events in European 
history: the EU 2004 expansion, the migration crisis of 2015 and the Brexit referendum of 2016. 
Over the years, 40 different European countries have participated in the different ESS studies. 
There are no ESS rounds where all countries participated, but often a good range of countries 
participated. In the ESS 1 from 2002, 22 countries participated, and in the ESS 8 from 2016, 23 
countries participated. In Germany, 2919 individuals participated in 2002 and 2852 individuals 





individuals participated in 20164. The ESS is based on random sampling which is an important 
factor when making conclusions on whole populations. The number of respondents is important 
to be high to fit with the model assumptions. Because the two countries used in this study have 
relatively high numbers of respondents compared to other countries, they prove to fit well with 
the method.  
 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is based on the question to what extent do you think 
[country] should allow individuals of a different race or ethnic group as most [country] 
individuals to come and live here? This variable is suitable for the research question of the 
current study. The variable is coded like this: 4: Allow many to come and live here, 3: Allow 
some, 2: Allow a few 1: Allow none, 7: Refusal, 8: Don't know, 9: No answer. Where 7, 8 and 
9 are not being accounted for in the analysis, therefore the scale of the variable ranges from one 
to four5. Thus, the higher the value, the higher the support toward migration. In both years, 
there were migration inflows from countries that can be seen as more different than the majority 
population in Germany and the United Kingdom. For example, migrants from Slavic countries 
in 2002 and migrants from Syria and northern Africa in 2016.  
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
The first independent variable is educational level, this variable differs between the countries 
because both countries have different levels of education and education systems. The questions 
asked are what is the highest level of education you have achieved? (2002), and what is the 
highest level of education you have successfully completed? (2016). Because the two countries 
differ in levels of education, the variables will be recoded into the following dummy categories: 
0: no higher education completed and 1: higher education completed, where higher education 
is counted as a university degree of at least bachelor level. This will enable us to compare the 
two countries in terms of the effect of education on attitudes toward migration and will 
distinguish between higher educated from lower educated individuals. The next independent 
 
4 The 2002 survey consisted of 42 359 respondents in total and the 2016 survey consisted of 44 387 respondents 
in total. 
5 In the pooled models for Germany, there were 1149 (20%) missing values, in the pooled models for the United 
Kingdom, there were 957 (23,9%) missing values.  
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variable is the Age of respondent, this variable is assessed similarly in the two countries, but 
their way of calculating differs over time. With this variable, the effect of age is analyzed.  
Household’s total net income, from all sources is a variable measuring income. Previous 
research argued that this was a major determinant of migration attitudes. The variable is coded 
according to ten different income deciles where the lowest value represents the lowest income 
decile. The reason for this being a suitable variable is that it takes into account all types of 
income on the household level, no considerations to individual income are made here. This 
means that if the attitudes change because of income, it counts better than individual income. 
The individual income might be low, but your household might have a higher income, which 
still results in a higher disposable income.  
The last variable is placement on the left/right scale. Previous research argues that political 
placement is a good indicator on migration attitudes, where right-wing individuals are more 
critical toward migration than left-wing individuals. The variable is coded on a scale from 0 to 
10, where 0 = left and 10 = right. In other words, the higher the value, the more right-wing the 
respondent is. It is always hard to measure political differences between countries because 
different countries have different political parties with different values. But using a general 
left/right scale is a good generalized political scale able to be used in many countries. Higher 
values of left/right scale are expected to give lower values of the dependent variable.  
 
3.3. Limitations and Scope 
There are several disadvantages that should be considered when working with these kinds of 
data and models. The main limitation of working with the country level instead of the whole 
survey is the amount of data. As can be seen in the previous chapter (3.2.), there are significant 
differences in how many individuals participated in the total study compared to the country 
level. The total survey consisted of over 40000 respondents were the national level circles 
around 2000 respondents. In general, a higher number of respondents will result in more 
accurate correlations when using regression analysis. It is possible that the findings will not be 
significant on the national level compared to the whole survey. Another limitation is that some 
of the questions are not entirely similar over the years or the countries, they are for instance 
asked in different languages. This could result in the respondents interpreting the question 
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differently and hence give other answers. In addition, some of the questions can be sensitive 
and lead to the respondent either not answering at all or answering different. For example, the 
questions about income or political views can be seen as sensitive. Finally, the fact that school 
systems are not entirely the same results in the chance that respondents answer differently in 
both countries. Although, using data from the ESS helps us with addressing these issues. The 
ESS data is found to be the most suitable for these kinds of studies, in particular because they 
operate over many European countries and give us the opportunity to compare. The differences 




4. Results & Findings 
In this chapter, the results and findings of the analysis will be presented. First, differences in 
attitudes toward migration will be presented by showing statistics in the format of a diagram. 
In addition, descriptive statistics of the sample will be presented. In the second phase, regression 
models for each country and year will be presented. After this, the different main regression 
analyses will be presented. First, the results for Germany will be presented, how did the results 
differ between 2002 and 2016. Then the data for the United Kingdom will be presented the 
same way as Germany. 
4.1. Attitudes Toward Migration - Descriptive Overview 
When looking at the shares of individuals supporting migration from different ethnicities than 
the majority ethnicity, there is as expected a shift toward more positive attitudes between 2002 
and 2016 in both Germany and the United Kingdom. Figure 4.1 shows how the shares of 
different attitudes have changed between 2002 and 2016 in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
The two negative attitudes (allow none & allow a few) have both decreased its share. The two 
positive attitudes (allow many & allow some) have both increased its share. In Germany, the 
shares of positive attitudes grew from 56,4 percent to 72,2 percent, which is a notable increase. 
In the United Kingdom, the shares of positive attitudes grew from 50,3 percent to 65,7 percent, 
which also is a mentionable increase. The attitude allow some is the most common attitude in 
both countries with around 50 percent of the total shares in 2016 (DE: 49,1 percent, UK: 51,8 
percent) and around 45 percent of the shares in 2002 (DE: 46.3 percent, UK: 43 percent). The 
most positive attitude allow many has increased in both countries, in Germany from 10,1 
percent to 22,1 percent, and in the United Kingdom from 7,3 percent to 13,9 percent.  
 
These findings can give support to hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 6, which asserts that the attitudes 
toward migration are more positive in 2016 than in 2002, and that Germans are more positive 
toward migration than British individuals. These findings alone are not sufficient to draw clear 
conclusions; the disparities between the two countries and over time might result from 
differences in the samples. For example, the positive change in attitudes over the years may 
result from the increase in the share of highly educated individuals, who are expected to have 
more positive attitudes. Therefore, Table 4.1 presents a descriptive overview of the sample by 
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country and year. Both hypotheses will be assessed again using multiple regression analyses, 
which these potential differences will be controlled for.  
 
Figure 4.1 Changes in attitudes in Germany and the UK between 2002 and 2016 
 
In Table 4.1 below, descriptive statistics are presented through frequency tables. The 
frequencies count for the pooled samples consisting of Germany in both years, the United 
Kingdom in both years, the year 2002 in both countries, and the year 2016 in both countries6. 
The findings show similar to Figure 4.1 that the positive attitudes are more common than the 
negative. The table also shows that most respondents have not achieved a higher education 
degree, but that more individuals are higher educated in 2016 compared to 2002. When 
comparing this to the attitudes, it could be predicted that education has a positive effect on 
migration attitudes. Looking at the net income variable, it could be seen that the mean always 
is above five, which means that the sample is overrepresented by high income individuals. 
Because the question in the survey asks the respondents to estimate their total net income from 
all sources, and it can be hard to count for other individual’s incomes, it might be that 
respondents tend to overestimate their total net income. For the left/right scale variable, it 
should be noted that answer 5 is overrepresented, this could mean that individuals do not want 
to answer the question and choose the most neutral answer.  
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Table 4.1 Frequency table on both dependent and independent variables 
 Germany 
United 
Kingdom 2002 2016 
  Allow many / few migrants     
Mean 2,734 2,565 2,514 2,82 
Std. dev. 0,803 0,831 0,81 0,799 
Allow none % 6,4 11,8 11,4 5,8 
Allowe a few % 29,8 30,5 34,8 25,3 
Allow some % 47,7 47,3 44,9 50,2 
Allowe many % 16,1 10.5 8,9 18,8 
 High education    
High educated % 30,8 36,5 27,8 38,6 
Low educated % 69,2 63,5 71,9 61,4 
 Age    
Mean 47,93 49,94 47,83 49,7 
Std. dev.  18,177 18,623 18,077 18,653 
            Total Net Income all Sources 
Mean 6,28 6,04 6,82 5,56 
Std. dev.  2,491 2,887 2,25 2,882 
1st decile % 4,4 7 0,7 10,2 
2nd decile % 4,4 6,7 1,3 9,3 
3rd decile % 5,5 7,7 2,7 10,1 
4th decile % 9,9 12,5 12,2 9,7 
5th decile % 13 11,2 14,7 9,9 
6th decile % 13,7 10 15,3 9,1 
7th decile % 14,1 9,3 13,6 10,7 
8th decile % 12,4 8,6 10,8 10,8 
9th decile % 13,4 14,5 17,6 10,1 
10th decile % 9,2 12,6 11 10,2 
 Left / right scale    
Mean  4,5 5,04 4,82 4,6 
Std. dev.  1,853 1,826 1,828 1,888 
Left % 3,5 2,5 2,4 3,8 
1 % 1,9 1,3 1,4 1,9 
2 % 7,6 4,1 5,5 6,9 
3 % 15,4 8,7 12,5 13 
4 % 13 11,5 12,1 12,8 
5 % 37,7 42,4 40,6 38,5 
6 % 8,3 11,4 9,5 9,6 
7 % 7,1 8,9 8,3 7,4 
8 % 3,8 6,1 5,2 4,2 
9 % 0,5 1,2 0,9 0,7 
Right % 1,1 1,9 1,6 1,3 
 Total     
N of cases 4622 3054 3760 3916 
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4.2. Attitudes Toward Migration by Country and Year 
Table 4.2 presents four different multivariate regression analyses for each country and year 
separately. The findings show as expected that higher education has a positive impact on 
migration attitudes in all four models. This means that individuals who have achieved a higher 
education degree, are on average more positive toward migration than individuals without 
higher education degree. In both countries, the effect seems to be more positive in 2002, but 
such conclusions cannot be made through just this kind of analysis, the next part of the results 
will enable us to assess this further and make clearer conclusions. Similar to education, net 
income has a positive correlation to migration attitudes, higher income results in more positive 
attitudes. Opposite to education and net income, age and left/right placement have a negative 
impact on migration attitudes. This means that older individuals are more negatively toward 
migration than younger individuals. The further right on the left/right scale you are, the more 
negative toward migration you become. These findings are in line with the expectations and 
show us what the general relations look like.  
 
Table 4.2 Multivariate regression analyses on Germany 2002 & 2016 and the UK 




































































R^2 Adjusted  
0,126 
  
0,126  0,11  0,115  
N  2165  2457  1595  1459  




4.3. Over Time Changes in Migration Attitudes - Germany 
When looking at the over time changes in migration attitudes in Germany using the regression 
data of 2002 and 2016 combined, several findings can be made. In table 4.3 four different 
models are presented. Model 1 consists of a regression model testing only the variables on 
Germany without adjusting for the year, the correlations are as expected and show the same 
directions as in Table 4.2.  
 
In model 2, the same variables are used with an addition of a year variable, this variable 
represents the year 2016. As the variable is positive, it means that if the respondent is from 
2016, the attitudes are on average more positive than in 2002. This suggests that overall, 
attitudes toward migration have become more positive over the years in Germany. All other 
variables show the same directions of correlations (positive/negative) as in model 1. However, 
model 2 does not assess whether differences in the sample characteristics explain the positive 
change in attitude toward immigrants over the years, or that individuals with the same 
characteristics became more positive toward immigrants. To examine whether differences in 
sample characteristics, such as average level of education or income levels, are the main factors 
that explain the positive trend in attitudes, Model 3 and 4 present the interactions between the 
survey year (2016) and the other independent variables. Model 4 is the model being analyzed 
the most, where model 3 only serves as a possibility for the variables Year X EDU and Year X 
Age to be controlled for. Though, education shows a slight decrease in effect between the years, 
it is not significant, and no differences can be found, implying that education does not explain 
the differences in attitudes over time. The same counts for age, no significant results can be 
shown, suggesting that age doesn’t explain the differences in attitudes over time either. In 
Germany, the only significant difference in a variable over time is net income, which is 
significant on the 0,05 level. The effect of net income is slightly less positive in 2016 compared 
to 2002. In other words, belonging to a higher decile in 2002 was associated with more positive 
attitudes toward migration then that of 2016. This implies that there is some kind of 
convergence between the income deciles over the years in attitudes toward migration. That 
being said, the convergence effect is somewhat small, while in 2002 the gap between the highest 
and the lowest income decile is 0,576 point of the scale, in 2016 it is 0,549. In sum when looking 
at the overtime changes in the attitudes toward migration we can see that most of the change is 
 
 28 
not explained by the changes in the explanatory variables, rather through other factors not being 
accounted for in this study.  
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Year X NI    
-0,003 
(0,001)*  
Year X L/R 












R^2 Adjusted 0,123 0,155 0,155 0,156 
N 4622 4622 4622 4622 
Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001  
 
4.4. Over Time Changes in Migration Attitudes - The United Kingdom 
For the United Kingdom, a similar regression was done, with similar results. In table 4.4. four 
models are presented the same way as with Germany. Model 1 shows a regression model 
without adjusting for the year. The results are similar to previous models, the positive/negative 
directions are the same for all independent variables, which indicates that the determinants work 
in the same direction for both countries. It should be mentioned that net income is not significant 
in model 1, but becomes significant in models 2, 3 and 4 after controlling for year of the sample. 
This insignificance can be explained by individuals answering inconsistent in 2002 compared 
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to the other year’s trends. Especially in the lower income deciles, the year 2002 sticks out from 
the rest. Table 4.1 shows that in 2002, only 0,7 percent chose the lowest income decile, while 
this number in the other 3 datasets lays between 4 percent and 10 percent. Because the 
frequencies in 2002 are inconsistent with the trends in the other years, the frequency distribution 
might not lead to a correlation. Table 4.2 corresponds with this insignificance, in the United 
Kingdom 2002, net income was less significant than the other four models. When the model 
below is adjusted for the changes in year, the income variable becomes significant.  
 
Model 2 includes a year variable showing the difference between the two years. Because the 
variable is positive it indicates that British individuals were more positive toward migration in 
2016 than in 2002, which corresponds well with previous findings such as in Figure 4.1. It also 
indicates that the trend in migration attitudes consists of a positive change over time in both 
Germany and the United Kingdom. However, model 2 doesn’t assess whether this change over 
time is explained by differences in the sample characteristics, or that individuals with the same 
characteristics became more positive toward immigrants. By presenting the interactions 
between the survey year (2016) and the other independent variables, models 3 and 4 try to 
explain if the independent variables are factors explaining the positive trend in attitudes.  
 
Model 3 serves as a possibility to control for the variables Year X EDU and Year X Age. For 
the case of the United Kingdom, only one of the variables had a significant change, which is 
education. Having a higher education has a less positive effect in 2016 than in 2002 in the 
United Kingdom. Both are significant on the 0,1 level. The other variables are not significant 
when testing for change over the years. In other words, this could mean that lower educated are 
more positive toward migration in 2016 than in 2002, reducing the gap in attitudes between 
higher and lower educated. This would imply that there is a convergence between being lower 
or higher educated in terms of the attitudes toward migration. Though, the convergence effect 
is small, the gap between having completed a higher education degree or not was 0,434 point 
of the scale in 2002, and 0,417 in 2016. Similarly to Germany, in the United Kingdom, we can 
see that the differences in attitudes between the years cannot be explained by the variables being 





Table 4.4 Regression models for the United Kingdom 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




















































Year X NI 
   
0,001  
(0,002) 
Year X L/R 












R^2 Adjusted 0,111 0,142 0,142 0,142 
N 3054 3054 3054 3054 













The aim of this paper has been to find over time differences in migration attitudes in Germany 
and the United Kingdom between 2002 and 2016 and find what this difference can be explained 
by. The reason for this was that not many studies have compared the years 2002 and 2016 with 
each other. Moreover, previous research argued that there have been few studies looking into 
national differences when analyzing migration attitudes. The research question has been: How 
have the attitudes toward migration changed between 2002 and 2016 in the United Kingdom 
and Germany? With this research question in mind, common determinants of migration 
attitudes were chosen as variables to measure these differences, and to test effects in different 
regression models. From this research question and these variables, ten different hypotheses 
were derived. Among the findings, support can be found for seven of these hypotheses.  
 
The first part of the results chapter showed that attitudes toward migration have become more 
positive over the years in both countries. This is an interesting development corresponding with 
findings by Heath & Richards (2016), Esipova et al. (2015) and Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor 
(2019), which shows that even in times when migration is seen as a main issue; after the 
migration crisis in 2016, the attitudes were more positive than in 2002, before the large EU 
expansion of 2004. Though some argue that Brexit happened because of migration critical 
arguments, the general migration attitudes were more positive in the year of Brexit, than before 
the EU 2004 enlargement. This raises the question if Brexit has affected the British attitudes 
toward migration. This paper doesn’t analyze short term trends and can hence not answer this 
question. It is interesting for future studies to see if the attitudes were on a rise or on a decline 
in 2016 compared to 2014. To connect this part of the findings to the research question, it can 
be said that attitudes became more positive in 2016, but the following parts analyzing the 
regression models will go into further details on this change.  
 
The second part of the results assess the effect of different individuals’ attributes on 
immigration attitudes using separate regression models for Germany and the United Kingdom 
in 2002 and 2016. The aim was to find the correlations between the independent variables and 
migration attitudes. The second parts’ findings show that education and net income have 
positive impacts on migration attitudes and that age and left/right placement have a negative 
impact on attitudes toward migration. This corresponds with previous findings by Esipova et 
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al. (2015), Mclaren & Paterson (2020), Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor (2019) and Davidov et al. 
(2020), which means that higher educated on average are more prone to take on positive 
attitudes toward migration than lower educated. The same counts for individuals who receive 
higher net incomes. When individuals get older or are more right-wing, the attitudes are on 
average more negative.  
 
The third and last part of the results aimed to find over time differences in migration attitudes 
in the two countries. In addition, it provided insight on how the independent variables affect 
this change. The third parts’ findings show that in both countries, attitudes toward migration 
were more positive in 2016 than in 2002, which corresponds with the descriptive statistics in 
Figure 4.1, and with previous findings (Heath & Richards, 2016, Esipova et al., 2015 and 
Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). The independent variables in this study are chosen after 
being presented in many papers as good determinants of migration attitudes. However, not as 
many papers have looked into over-time changes in these determinants. The general findings 
in this paper are that these common determinants are not good explainers to why there is a 
change over time in migration attitudes. Most variables resulted in no significant findings, with 
the exception for net income in Germany and education in the United Kingdom. It should be 
mentioned that the direction of these two changes were unexpected and do not correlate with 
hypotheses 7: the effect of higher education is larger in 2016 than in 2002, and hypothesis 8: 
the effect of net income is larger in 2016 than in 2002. The reason for this might be that more 
individuals are higher educated, which might result in a more diverse group of higher educated 
individuals representing more different values. Another reason might be that the income 
distribution is more equal in 2016 among the respondents, as in 2002, the lower income deciles 
were underrepresented (see table 4.1). The explanatory effects of these variables are though 
small, therefore are these determinants not sufficient to explain the changes in attitudes. This 
could open up for a follow up study instead focusing more on the specific determinants affecting 
change instead of the change in general. 
 
In summary this paper’s findings can give support to seven out of ten hypotheses. But there are 
no findings to support hypotheses 7: The effect of higher education is larger in 2016 than in 
2002, hypothesis 8: The effect of net income is larger in 2016 than in 2002, and hypothesis 10: 
The effect of the left/right placement is larger in 2016 than in 2002. In other words, this means 
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that the attitudes are more positive in 2016 than in 2002, and more positive in Germany than in 
the United Kingdom. The directions of the correlations are as expected. The models are though 
not sufficient to describe what the change in attitudes is based on.  
 
This paper contributes to the field of study by showing that migration attitudes have become 
more positive in both Germany and the United Kingdom, even though the national differences, 
there is a similar trend ongoing, which is in line with other papers (Heath & Richards, 2016, 
Esipova et al., 2015 and Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). Another contribution is that the 
variables education, age, net income and political placement, even if being good determinants 
of migration attitudes, do not affect the change over time in attitudes. These findings are not in 
line with other papers. Other papers would suggest that a change in migration attitudes is 
explained by the presence of foreign-born populations (Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019) or by 
concerns over the conditions or characteristics of a regional immigrant population (Markaki & 
Longhi, 2013). These variables were not analyzed in this paper because the ESS does not have 
sufficient data for these determinants. It would not have helped to add the migration shares to 
our models because they would not be connected to any attitudes.  
 
The aim of this paper has been to analyze differences in migration attitudes in two countries 
between two years. The used research question is derived from previous literature on migration 
attitudes about the importance of looking at national differences. This gives for future research 
many ideas to go even further into studying national differences in migration attitudes, for 
example by studying other countries. An interesting study would be to use different years, for 
example 2014 and 2016, to see if the migration crisis of 2015 has affected the migration 
attitudes. Lastly, where this paper failed to find what determinants affected the change in 
attitudes, a future study could instead look more specifically into what drives this change, 
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Appendix 1. Regression models for 2002 
 
2002 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




















































Country X NI 
   
0,041 
(0,012)*** 
Country X L/R 













R^2 Adjusted 0,113 0,12 0,12 0,125 
N 3760 3760 3760 3760 












Appendix 2. Regression models for 2016 
 
2016 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




















































Country X NI 
   
0,016 
(0,009)+ 
Country X L/R 












R^2 Adjusted 0,124 0,126 0,126 0,128 
N 3916 3916 3916 3916 
Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001  
 
